Quine’s ”Men in The Doorway” Argument: Genuine Philosophy or Rhetoric?

1. Introduction ¹

There seems to be a problem with possible entities. Do they have being? Do they not? Or are they to be categorized as something in-between? Can we just freely quantify over possible entities, without any ontological consequences and inconsistencies? Quine’s famous paper ‘On What There Is’ (1948) presents to the reader the fictional character of the philosopher Wyman. Wyman, after having posited the status of Pegasus (a fictional entity) as an unactualized possible – thus granting Pegasus some ontological status as an entity which subsists (Quine, 1948: 22-23) – is asked to take the following questions into consideration:²

Take, for instance [as proof of the fact that Wyman’s invocation of possibilia is problematic], the possible fat man in that doorway; and [_] the possible bald man in that doorway. [1.] Are they the same possible man, or two possible men? [2.] How do we decide? [3.] How many possible men are in that doorway? [4.] Are there more possible thin ones than fat ones? [5.] How many or them are alike? [6.] Or would there being alike make them one? [7.] Are no two possible things alike? [8.] Is this the same as saying, that it is impossible for two things to be alike? [8.] Or, finally, is the concept of identity simply inapplicable to unactualized possibles? [9.] But what sense can be found in talking of entities which cannot meaningfully be said to be identical with themselves and distinct from one another? (Quine, 1948:23-24)

The central point of this has been interpreted as follows: “Quine’s complaint is that there is no sensible way to individuate non-existent objects. No entity without identity […]” (Priest, 2016: 111). Wyman, the character charged with answering these questions, is viewed in the literature as being a caricature of a Meinongian, or a noneist (though, as will be argued, he is not) (Priest, 2016: 109). Noneism – a position inspired by certain aspects of the object theory of Alexius Meinong – maintains that one can quantify over something without taking it to exist (Priest, 2008: 42). A noneist position maintains that one can distinguish between two types of quantification: (1.) neutral quantification (“some x__ are__ ”, i.e., quantification which does not posit the existence of the entities in question) and loaded quantification (“there is an x that is__ ”, i.e., quantification which does posit the being as existing) (Priest, 2008: 42; Von Soldokoff & Woodward, 2013: 560). A response to Quine’s argument, following Priest (2008), could be: “The success [of Quine’s argument], I am afraid, is more the result of Quine’s silver rhetoric than his arguments.” (Priest, 2008: 53). This essay is concerned with this option.

In this essay, I will (I) analyse the manner in which Wyman is used by Quine (what can be said to be Wyman’s philosophical commitments), (II) the presuppositions behind the “men in the doorway” argument, and (III) conclude that whilst the noneist does have some argumentative moves to parry Quine’s supposed knock-out argument, overemphasizing the “rhetorical” aspect of the text (such as Wyman’s role) misses the point.³

2. Wyman. Who Is He?

Wyman has, since Quine’s essay, managed to migrate outside of its confines. In the text ‘Meta-Ontology’ (1998) by Peter Van Inwagen – a text which is interested in explicating the “meta-ontological”⁴ assumption of Quinian (and Quine’s) ontology – Wyman appears in a parody of a situation which is grounded upon a distinction between ‘there is’ and ‘exists’ (the distinction which Wyman wants to make, as we will see). Wyman comes into Van Inwagen’s office, supposedly with proof that Meinong himself stated that his theory was inconsistent: four hours later, Van Inwagen comes into Wyman’s study irritated that he has told him about a passage which does not exist. Wyman responds “There is such a passage. After all, you were looking for it: there is something you were looking for. I think I can explain your error; although there is such a passage, it doesn’t exist.” (Van Inwagen, 1998: 236). The point of the story is that anyone who does not subscribe to Quine’s meta-ontological commitment that being is the same as existence (Van Inwagen, 1998: 235) is bound to run into absurd situations. Is this also the case with the Wyman in Quine (1948)? To answer this question, and to understand the significance of the challenge posed by the “men in the doorway” argument, we need to turn back to the original description of Wyman in Quine.

Wyman appears in a significant moment of the argument in Quine (1948). Wyman appears after the shortcomings of another fictive philosopher McX’s rendering of fictional entities (Pegasus) has already been established. The reason for introducing McX in the first place is to problematize the problem of non-being, “Plato’s Beard”: “Non-being must in some sense be, otherwise what is it that there is not?” (Quine, 1948: 21). Quine, in introducing Wyman, is thus concerned with showing a more “subtle” way of solving the problem of what is not. How does Wyman do this? By positing Pegasus (an entity which it would be “common-sense” to claim as not existing, not being an entity at all)⁵ as an ‘unactualized possible’ (Quine, 1948: 22). This can lead to the confusion that Wyman is a Meinongian caricature, qua his acceptance of the ‘existence/subsistence thesis’ (see below). Let us break this concept down bit by bit, as it appears in the text. ‘Unactualized’, for a philosopher such as Wyman, means “that which has not become actual” (Quine, 1948: 23). ‘Actual’ is to be taken in the sense of “__ is [exists]”. When talking about Pegasus, in relation to actuality, Wyman is thus claiming that one cannot attribute any spatial-temporal existence to Pegasus, but this does not exclude Pegasus’ subsisting: this amounts to making the distinction between exists and there is, separating the one from the other. This sounds reminiscent of Meinong’s ‘existence/subsistence thesis’, which posits that being (Sein) can be distinguished into two modes: (1.) spatial and temporal existence, (2.) subsistence (Jacquette, 1996: 9). We have to notice that – unlike noneists – Wyman is not saying that fictional entities like Pegasus are not. Rather, he is still committed to Pegasus having some kind of being, just not any actual (spatial-temporal) existence. This thus also does not commit us to see Wyman as a full-on Meinongian either, since Meinongians can say that Pegasus’ “Such-Being” (So-Sein) (Pegasus in his “being-thus-and-so”) is not the same as his being (Jacquette, 1996: 9). Wyman thus seems to have a meta-ontological commitment like this (‘Meta-ontological’ in the sense given to the term by Van Inwagen (see footnote 3)) “Being and existence (actuality) are not coextensive.”.

Wyman is also committed to a view of contradiction. Quine, after explaining what would happen if one pressed Wyman to take notice of contradictory entities, writes the following: “Wyman was not the first to embrace this alternative. The doctrine of the meaninglessness of contradictions runs away back. The tradition survives, moreover, in writers such as Wittgenstein who seem to share none of Wyman’s intentions.” (Quine, 1948: 24: emphasis added). If related to what we said above, the implication is that the reason for meaningfully quantifying over Pegasus but not a contradictory entity (e.g., ‘the round square copula on Berkeley College’) is that Pegasus is not an entity which – if stated in the form of a proposition “a winged horse that causes the stream Hippocrene to spring from Mount Helicon with a blow of his hoof.” (Merriam-Webster, 2025) – implies contradiction. Wyman thus seems to have another meta-ontological commitment, “contradictory entities do not have any meaning”.

Finally, I want to draw attention to the relationship between ‘meaning’ and ‘naming’ in Wyman’s theory. To do this, I will quote 2 formulations from Quine’s text, and then turn to the uncovering of the meta-ontological commitment which can be identified as an implicit assumption of them:

In the first quote, Wyman seems to be a very poor Meinongian (if one at all), since he takes Such-Being to be coextensive with Being: as already noted, this is not a Meinongian thesis. Another way that Wyman may be said to be a poor man’s Meinongian can be identified in the fact that a Meinongian is not committed to the existence of an intentional object of an assumption without further ado: every assumption is directed toward and intended object (the ‘intentionality thesis’) (Jacquette, 1996: 9), but this is not the same as a claim of existence. In Wyman adds to the troubles. Quine – as the explanation of what he means by meaning and naming indicates – obviously has Frege’s distinction between “Sinn” (meaning) and “Bedeutung” (Reference: ‘Naming’ in Quine) in mind (Frege, 1948). To excavate all of the intricacies of Frege’s theory of natural language and the way in which he employs sinn and bedeutung is beyond the scope of this essay. However, as Genoveva Marti (1998) writes: “[…] (Sinn) […] makes the expression significant and determines its […] (‘Bedeutung’), […], the entity the expression applies to or designates. […] although the two names are coreferential, they are associated with different senses and those senses present the referent in different ways.” (Marti, 1998). Now, this distinction and conceptual complexity is lost on Wyman: he cannot recognize it. Wyman thus seems to have another meta-ontological commitment, “meaning and naming are always coupled together”.

We have now uncovered three meta-ontological commitments which we can ascribe to Wyman: (i) being and existence (actuality) are not coextensive, (ii) contradictory entities do not have any meaning, and (iii) meaning and naming are always coupled together. In the current reconstruction of Wyman’s position, (iii) and (ii) (qua the principle of charity) also implies the notion that (iv) contradictory entities do not have being, neither in the sense of existence nor subsistence. Now, I propose to return to the “men in the doorway” argument, to see if it is really more a piece of rhetoric than philosophy?

Quine’s Possible Men. “Silver Rhetoric” or Philosophy? Answer and Conclusion

Let us now return to the “men in the doorway” argument quoted in section (1.). First, I will provide a rough schematization of the questions, grouping them together to the best of my ability into overall topics. The questions are – of course – meant to build upon one another in the argument itself. This is done purely for simplicity of expression.

1. Questions pertaining to countability: [1.], [3.], [4.]
2. Questions pertaining to identit: [5.], [6.], [7.], [8.], [9.]
3. Questions pertaining to individuation: [1.], [2.], [5.], [6.], [7.], [8.], [9.]

How can Wyman answer these questions? The questions of column 1 can be answered by Wyman in a similar way as in Priest (2008): “None: possibilia are not in space and time or, therefore, doorways.” (Priest, 2008: 53). This is also consistent with the reconstruction of Wyman’s meta-ontological commitments. The questions pertaining to column 2 can be answered by Wyman in a similar way as Routley (1982): “The criterion for identity for nonentities is, as for entities, coincidence in extensional properties.” (Routley, 1982: 156). Nothing stops Wyman (according to our reconstruction of his position) from making the same claim. It is, however, the third column which is problematic for Wyman.

A noneist, in response to the third column, could reasonably claim that there is no problem here either. Two moves can be made simultaneously: they may claim that there is no difficulty in claiming individuation for a non-entity, since what individuates non-entities – like existent entities – is the positive difference in extensional properties (Routley, 1982: 156); moreover, anoneist may protest to the implicit loaded nature of the question (in the sense that they imply the condition of existence (see section (1.) for the distinction). However, the noneist is able to do this because entities like Pegasus are non-entities. Pegasus does not exist (in any sense), but that does not exclude us logically being able to quantify over entities such as Pegasus. Wyman, however, cannot make any of these moves himself. This is because entities like Pegasus are not non-entities for Wyman, but some in-between between non-being and being. Therefore, whilst Wyman can (as argued for above) claim that entities like Pegasus are not spatial-temporal, and that we do not need to worry about the identity of Pegasus as Pegasus, he has trouble getting around the questions of individuation. This problem, roughly, boils down to the fact that he would then either have to speak as if Pegasus was an actual (spatial-temporal) being, or drop the concept of ‘unactualized possible’ from his ontological arsenal. Wyman is not subtle enough.

The question still remains: “is this primarily ‘silver rhetoric’ or genuine philosophy?”. My answer to this question is that it is not primarily ‘silver rhetoric’. Such a charge misses the point. In a symposium on ‘On What There Is’ (1951), Quine maintained the following: “I have not said in “On What There Is,” […] that it is wrong to admit abstract entities. But it is wrong to admit abstract entities and gloss over their admission.” (Geach, Ayer, & Quine, 1951: 158: emphasis added). Quine wanted to make us aware of how our admission of certain kinds of entities have consequences for how we construct our quantifiers (Geach, Ayer, & Quine, 1951: 159). Wyman, as already said, is not a noneist. Neither does he map neatly as a Meinongian. He is still significant. He signifies a solution to Plato’s beard which allows for an in-between space between non-being and being, in tension with how we ordinarily quantify over entities.

Quine’s paper – and the “men in the doorway” argument – raises our philosophical awareness of our inclusion of certain kinds of entities. The central lesson is therefore that we cannot freely quantify over possible entities without an awareness of the consequences said quantification has for our understanding of what is. Whether we agree with Quine is another matter entirely. However, the only goal of this essay was to show that Quine is not a mere rhetorician.

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